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ON THE SCALES OF PHOTOGRAPHIC
ABSTRACTION
This article explores three key ways in which questions of abstraction have been and
continue to be closely associated with photography: the tradition of photographs that
desire to “be” abstract; the invisible but determining forms of abstraction central to
capitalism and shaping of photography as a technical-historical form; and the technical-
conceptual abstractions embedded in and structuring of photographic apparatuses. The
exploration of these themes is pursued through analysis of Vilém Flusser’s philosophy of
photography, Lambert Wiesing’s analysis of abstract photography and Allan Sekula’s
critique of capitalist modes of equivalence and exchange as these impact on the photo-
graphic. These analyses are pursued through exploration of the issues, processes and
operations of “scale”, “scaling” and “scalability” entailed in these three modes of abstraction
and in their critical and theoretical reflection. The aim of this strategy is to outline and to
analyse the complex web of abstractions that are central to photography and the modes of
scale that are crucial to abstraction in this context. The article suggests that to encounter
or to think about abstraction photographically is to operate within some modulation of
scale and that this may in fact be the closest one can get to envisioning the complexity of
abstraction in the photographic context.
What are the ways in which abstraction has been and might continue to be of concern
for photography? Two answers are familiar: on the one hand, there are those
photographs or techniques that abstract from the apparently defining tasks of photo-
graphy, to figure and to represent things, and, on the other hand, the invisible but
determining forms of abstraction central to capitalism and shaping of photographic
appearances and uses. I would add to these a third, less often cited, register of
abstraction in photography — namely, those largely invisible elements of photographic
apparatuses that serve to enable both the representational and non-representational
uses towards which they are oriented and through which the abstractions of capitalism
find material photographic form. Vilém Flusser’s theorisation of the calculable condi-
tions of the photographic articulates these conditions in terms of a concatenation of
technical-scientific concepts, protocols and material conventions that are sedimented in
photographic apparatuses and structuring of their ability to produce photographic
images (Flusser Towards a Philosophy; “Towards a Theory”).
At the risk of only skimming the surface of each, this article attempts to hold all
three of these modes of abstraction in view. A suspicion orients this strategy: that the
current understanding of abstraction’s on-going association with photography will
remain limited unless one returns to thinking about such various registers in relation
to one another. And this suspicion arises from existing discourse on abstraction and
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photography. Writing about “abstract photographs” often only seems to produce end-
game rehearsals of their status as art and also tends towards over-extended formalisa-
tions of both abstraction and photography. Critical accounts of the universalised forms
of social abstraction playing across the surfaces of images often seem challenged by
change in the expansive and intensifying relations they question. Accounts of the
calculable nature of the photographic apparatus frequently seem overwhelmed by a
pessimism in which the apparatus seems fated a priori to conquer all.
This article approaches the task of thinking about photography and abstraction
through discussion of three examples that are helpful in avoiding the pitfalls just
described. Vilém Flusser’s philosophy of photography has already been named as one
focus. Lambert Wiesing’s analysis of abstract photography and Allan Sekula’s critique
of capitalist modes of equivalence and exchange will be the basis of the following two.
But before going on to consider them, the questions framing these discussions should
be clarified.
Abstraction — photography — scale
The task of this article is to explore the issues, processes and operations of “scale”,
“scaling” and “scalability” entailed in the three modes of abstraction noted above. Two
intuitions guide this exploration: that a complex web of abstractions is central to
photography and that the modulation and variation of scale in photography is central to
abstraction in this context. I suggest that to encounter or to think about abstraction
photographically is to operate within some modulation of scale and that this may in fact
be the closest one can get to envisioning the complexity of abstraction in the
photographic context. But following through on this suggestion entails an expansion
in and a complication of what the term scale might mean (see Fisher “Photographic
Scale”).
The strategy is to take a step to one side to view photography through the prism of
those senses of scale already harboured in its modes of abstraction. Attention to
variations in the senses of scale entailed by these abstractions might enable one to
delineate that which articulates and gives flesh to photography’s part in capitalism’s
abstraction of social value, that grants significance to those moments at which photo-
graphy eschews its normative representational and figural functions, and that renders
the sense in which every photographic image is anticipated by a concatenation of
abstract calculations.
An initial transposition of the three registers of abstraction sketched above into
scaled terms might re-describe some of their important features as follows. What one
is dealing with is the massive “scale” of the photographic as such and as its forms and
processes impinge on lived experience, with the modes and effects of “scaling”
foregrounded by image-objects that seek to free themselves photographically from
representation, and with the operations of “scalability” inscribed in the photographic
apparatus as these render the world photographable. The term scale, in this context,
thus borrows from debates about the production of space in political geography and
critical art. It denotes phenomenological and material processes of encounter with
photographic objects, apparatuses and the situations they structure. It refers one to
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basic photographic functions, the ways in which things are set in temporally and
spatially scaled relation to one another. Photography seems peculiar insofar as it
appears to hinge on, produce and reproduce all of these modes and meanings of
scale simultaneously.
The proposal here is to project links between each of these photographic modes of
abstraction and such issues and forms of scale, scaling and scalability. The intuitions to
be developed are that scale is a register of abstraction in photography — perhaps that
it can be thought of as the phenomenal form taken by abstraction in photographic
terms — and that issues of scale are crucial to each of the modes of abstraction
indicated above. Thinking of these in their scalar aspects might enable one to hold their
intertwined character in view and to evaluate what this means for the relationship
between abstraction and photography more generally.
The background premise informing this is that, in one way or another, some
process of, or encounter at scale — some orchestration of the different scales
indicated — is always involved in any act, process, experience, object or machinery
of photography. Risking an overly formal inversion, one might say that without its
variously scaled characteristics and values, its operations of scaling, the propensity of
its objects to be scaled, de-scaled and re-scaled, its setting of ostensible things to scale,
its inscription in spatially and temporally scaled relations and the ways in which these
are bound within hugely scalable infrastructures, there would be no photography.
So, you are being asked to entertain the notion that one or other combination of
facts, operations and phenomena of scale is a necessary feature of all photography and
that this fact is significant. A varying and ubiquitous operation of different senses of
scale, modes of scaling, scaled phenomena and conditions of scalability traverse the
machinery, processes, uses and experiences that comprise the sprawling terrain of the
photographic and, I argue, can be taken as a constant for photography (Fisher “Scale
the Photographic Horizons”).
The relationship between photography and abstraction placed in question here
hinges on the projection of a parallel to the way in which I have previously articulated
three significant ways in which issues of scale appear integral to photography. These
can be summarised as follows:
● That photographs set space and time together and to scale in the form of an image.
● That, whilst photographic images tend to take fixed seeming material forms, these
are contingent moments on a sliding scale of possible actualisations.
● That photography not only has a substantial globalised scale but that its geo-
political import is grounded in and through the scaling operations and processes it
operates within and serves to facilitate. (Fisher “Photographic Scale” 156)
These different modes of scale meet each other, so to speak, in the photograph.1
One might go so far to say that qua images, photographs exist in or emerge from
the tension between these intercalated and simultaneously operative horizons of
scale, scaling and scalability. Implications to be drawn from this are that photo-
graphy’s representational character as a visual image form, questions of the materi-
ality and/or immateriality of the photographic image and photography’s expanding
and increasingly intensified roles in the global order of contemporary capitalism are
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bound up with one another in ways that invite conceptualisation as modes of
photography’s variegated scales. And the meeting of these in the photograph, I
argue, registers the process of photography’s intertwined modes of abstraction as
they take on form.
Abstraction and scalability
As it appears integral to the other modes of abstraction identified in the introduction, I
will turn first to Vilém Flusser’s theorisation of photography. Flusser’s writings on
photography offer a salutatory critical account of the forms and operations of calcula-
tion that he sees at work in photographic images, which set the terms for whatever
photography gives to be seen and the experiences that photographs might elicit. What
is of concern here is the manner in which he sees photography as being conditioned by
the concatenated operation of technical-scientific concepts, protocols and material
conventions sedimented in the photographic apparatus. For Flusser, such features
anticipate photographic images and their possible uses. They inform the photographic
apparatus, are defining of its operation and thus set the parameters of what might be
pictured photographically: “The camera is programmed to produce photographs and
every photograph is a realization of one of the possibilities contained within the
programme of the camera” (Flusser Towards a Philosophy 26).
Famously, for Flusser, images are “significant surfaces” that signify “something …
in space and time that they have to make comprehensible to us as abstractions” (8).
The way that photographic images, in particular, do this is layered with further
abstractions. Like other images, the photograph is an abstraction from the perceptual
form of things. But the elements of a photograph bear a more highly mediated
correspondence with that which they combine to stand for. And, crucially, this
mediation presents itself in and as the photograph’s immediate appearance. The
process of making a photographic image is one in which its programmed conditions
make themselves invisible, but continue in this mode of invisibility to haunt what
might be made of any representation they present to view. The immediacy of
photographic appearances harbours these technical conditions as their defining
abstraction.
The product of an imaging apparatus, the technical image, presents a significant
surface that Flusser distinguishes from traditional images (such as paintings) insofar as
non-technical image forms bear marks of their making out of which one is supposed to
be able to read “directly” the actions of its maker. Whether or not one finds this
convincing as an understanding of the image forms Flusser names traditional, it does
serve to project and fill out what is distinctive about the technical image, which is by
contrast “indirect”. The indirect form of the technical image arises from the fact that an
apparatus shaped by “scientific texts” produces it (14). This concatenation of applied
theories (such as those of mechanics, computing and optics) can be understood in
scaled terms by taking the camera as an example.
The fact that photographs might be taken to be representations at all derives from
variable and associated technical processes organised into an apparatus that is oriented
to set the appearance of things in scaled relation to one another, such as through the
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control of focus, exposure and aperture. Spatial and temporal relationships between
things are thus registered through a predetermined combination of explicit scaling
functions that both offer and circumscribe a range of possibilities according to which
orders and ratios of scale — for instance, relative size and position, surface area and
overlap, acuity and blur — are established in the making of a photographic image. The
resulting image tends to efface these operations by directing attention towards the
appearance of what it might depict. It pretends, so to speak, to be directly inter-
pretable whilst also harbouring hidden operations that circumscribe what can be
imaged and how. The form and the operations in question here are explicitly scaled
and through this scale accrues an expansive sense.
In their scaling operation and in their scaled results photographic apparatuses
produce what one might call a doubled visualisation of abstraction: firstly, in the
sense of abstracting from the perceptual form of things to constitute their image and,
secondly, as an expression of the underlying theoretical framework of the apparatus or
as, in effect, the production of a representational image that is also a visualisation of the
particular combination of invisible operations that enabled its making.
One never encounters anything represented in and by photography — whether
places, things, moments or events — other than through a combination of processes
that set salient aspects of appearance to scale in the more or less enduring but also
changeable material form of an image. These scaling operations not only afford the
photographic image’s representational effects; they are also determined as conditions
by the various bodies of technical knowledge and commercial interest governing the
industries producing photographic apparatuses and the technologised image cultures
these economic processes facilitate and seek to exploit. Here is a register of the third
general characterisation of scale made in relation to photography: the operation of
photography at a global scale and its complex and multiple scaling operations. Though
it goes against the grain of Flusser’s own vocabulary, one can note here that the
concatenation of functions that comprise the programmed character of the apparatus is
marked by the Marxian forms of both “real” and “social” abstraction, and the register of
their overlapping relation is the meeting of these different scaling operations in the
particular scale found by an image-object and the orienting possibilities structuring the
array of equipment that produced it.2
Though discussions of Flusser don’t tend to remark the fact, his theory of
photography is inherently scaled.3 He articulates the notion of apparatus as an
explicit question of scale in a section of the book Post-History called “Our
Shrinking”, which describes processes of scaling associated with the consolidation
of technically articulated social relations (75‒90; see also Flusser “Orders”).
Contrasting the gigantic and monstrous proportions of key modern apparatuses
(such as the machine and the city and their systems of relation) with a technolo-
gically facilitated movement towards “miniaturisation”, he criticises the tendency to
see, in the small-scale economies of relation enabled by increasingly automated and
autonomously acting programmed technologies, an alternative to a spectre of the
large-scale “megalomania of the apparatus” (Flusser Post-History 76). The kinds of
autonomy promised by “intelligent instruments” equipped with “mini-programmes”
are always already inscribed in a totality to the effect that small-scale possibilities
are determined by the way they “work within and in function of gigantic apparatus”
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(77). As he writes elsewhere in the same book: “In such an environment we are all
played players, Homines ludentes” (104).
The most intimate, immediate or fixed-seeming experience of photography, in
particular those arising from connections between micro- and macro-level processes in
contemporary photographic apparatuses, is shot through with such scaled relations and
the implications Flusser draws out of them. Scalability is decisive for the relational
operation of this apparatus as it knits together effects and technical processes on the
intersubjective terrain of photographic usage. But this can also be said of even those
moments of photography that seem most divorced from the worldliness of representa-
tion and the social relations it figures.
Abstract photography
The self-conscious pursuit of an “abstract” photography has a long history, a core
tendency of which takes the form of variations on a desire to turn photography to the
production of non-representation and non-figuration.4 This highlights a defining tension
in the idea of abstract photography that can be simply expressed. Setting out not to
picture things with photography, to “free” it from representation, foregrounds the
photographic status of its creations. As Gottfried Jäger has it in his essay “Abstract
Photography”, what is projected by this desire is a “different photography, one which
does not refer to a reality outside the picture, as is always the case with likenesses and
symbolic images. Instead, it only refers to itself” (166). This formalist sentiment is
often repeated in discussions of abstract photography, and the function of auto-
referentiality it projects is generally supposed to act as guarantee for the artistic status
of the resulting image-object and to reveal, in an auto-poetic manner, something
essential about photography.5
It is against this formalist backdrop that Lambert Wiesing’s “What Could ‘Abstract
Photography’ Be?” analyses the idea that it can only proceed by abstracting from one or
more of the conventional functions of the photographic apparatus. With regard to the
representational and figural logic of photography this entails a sliding scale of technical-
historical renunciations that bring photography to its limits: starting out with the
removal of pictorial content, camera and lens from the photographic process and
extending to the absence of an object interposed between light source and light-
sensitive surface (photograms, lumigrams and chemigrams are his examples here)
(65‒68). For Wiesing, these variations on the abstract photograph concentrate
attention on infrastructural elements that normally efface themselves when a photo-
graphic image presents something to be seen. As an image-object the abstract photo-
graph foregrounds the visualisation of the absence of representation and figuration and
thus makes emphatic the technical-material structures through which this absence finds
manifestation. In this respect he writes:
The problem of abstract photography, remarkably, is not the simple statement that it
does not display a recognizable object, but the giving of reasons why and for what an
abstract photo abstracts from the depiction of a familiar object. The solution to this
problem is related to the phenomenon… that every abstraction happens in order to
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direct attention to something that is judged to be essential. When we abstract, we
disregard something and thereby show that we think we can disregard it. Thereby, in
turn, we show that what we disregard, from our point of view, cannot be essential,
since essential things can, in principle, not be disregarded. That is why every
abstraction always leads to an exhibition of what is deemed essential; every abstracting
turning away is linked to a visualizing turn toward. (70)
This sets up his threefold answer to the question of what abstract photography
could be. It might forgo the conventions of display “for the sake of image-immanent
structures”, “mere visibility” or “object art” (79). The important difference between
the abstraction from and display of something, here, lies in their relative directedness:
“outwards” towards the world of photographable things or “inwards” to the conditions
that enable this depiction but also its suspension. And it is this metaphor of doubled
and rhythmically articulated turning that, I think, saves Wiesing’s analysis from the
pitfalls of aesthetic formalism which otherwise undercut the interest of discourse on
abstract photographs. Only the abstract photograph, for Wiesing, makes manifest that
“we cannot create a photo that does not develop visible structures” and that “the
structures and forms that we see in abstract photography … are the structures and
forms that could display something but display nothing” (72). Yet he is careful not to
hypostatise that which might be “deemed essential” in the process, to make it into a
crudely determined essence deriving from one or other discreet aspect of photography.
The actual linkages between what an “abstracting turning away” and a “visualizing turn
toward” turn upon remain contingent and variable and the care with which Wiesing
articulates this makes his analysis of abstract photography productive.
But what of scale here? Starting from the second of my general observations on the
scaled character of the photographic, one might reappraise Wiesing’s account of the
abstract photograph. The singular status of the abstract photographic art objects he
defends seems to stand in stark opposition to the labile and contingent infrastructural
processes, which make these objects possible and that underpin their claim to
significance.6 Their often otherwise interesting characteristics notwithstanding, such
works tend to foreground the operation of combined infrastructural processes whilst
hypostatising these into a static form that is supposed to crystallise something essential
about photography. Non-pictorial visualisations of what is deemed essential in the
process foreground surface and pattern, tonal contrast, apparent depth of relations,
blur and sharpness and the manner in which these results stand in relation to one
another on the bounded surface of the image-object. Such features, I argue, act as
visualisations of the broadly conceived scaling operations articulated above as these
characterise the infrastructural operations that may be placed in question. One might
say that, divorced of their representational function, abstract photographs do nothing
but scale, show that they have scaled and, importantly, that they remain open to
further scaling in ways that undercut their apparent autonomy.
Furthermore, what thinking about abstract photographs in formalist terms tends
not to acknowledge is that along with the evacuation of outside reference they tend to
deny the other modes of abstraction to which they are subject and which the
refiguration of their auto-referential — zero-degree — visualisation in scaled terms
might help to reinscribe them with. One might think of the fact that, as image-objects,
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they remain open as possibilities of scaling and that this would reintroduce questions of
the alienation of value — of their abstracted commodity form — that the formalist
self-description seems concerned to deny. In being set within circuits of reproduction,
for instance, they remain as open to processes of de- and re-scaling as all other
photographic images. Though it might seem supplementary, I argue that it is not
actually extra to their existence as photographic works; it is integral to it insofar as this
is a photographic possibility, much in the mode of Benjamin’s observation that the aura
of the artwork dissolves in the face of technical reproduction (Benjamin 221). Abstract
photographs attain their formalised status as art through what turns out to be a heavily
ironic play on the very conditions that threaten this status. Viewed through the prism
of scale, the essentialist formalism associated with abstract photographs becomes an
ironised marker of the sliding scales of possible actualisation to which all photographs
are subject. This sets them within a horizon of determining social abstractions. By
forgetting the social abstraction of value that contextualises them, their claim to
abstraction becomes contradictory.
Here we can return to Wiesing’s claim that infrastructural elements of photo-
graphy revealed by an abstraction from the functions of the apparatus are variable but
necessary, always operative but contingent. The significance of such elements is
constitutively fluid and labile, not located in any particular process but in the fact
that whatever form it takes photography is always constituted as a combination of
processes that are oriented to register and to show something. If one were to divorce
this from the formalist concern to reduce photography down to an absence of
representation one might read Wiesing as having shown that such uses of photography
are refinements and extensions of a generic propensity common to all photographic
apparatuses and implied by all photographic images: that a basic function of photo-
graphy is to register the ostensible spatial and temporal state of things, to fix these
together at certain scales of relation and according to a combination of prefigured
operations of scale and anticipations of scaled outcomes. Given that the operations
described here are the locus, the meeting point of different meanings of scale in and for
photography, the contingent modes and possibilities of “abstracting turning away” and
“visualizing turning toward” that stand to reveal abstraction only multiply. The
abstractions performed by abstract photography thus stand out as second-order
modes of abstraction resting on strategies aimed at disambiguating photography’s
propensity for setting things to scale and the different registers of abstraction that
already attend this.
Abstraction and the scaling of photographic materiality
The forms and processes of abstraction integral to capitalism impinge upon all of the
senses of abstraction discussed above. There is, as John Roberts recently remarked, “no
photography — no photographic imaginary — that lives, or might live, on the other
side of its effects” (94). Allan Sekula’s analyses of the forms of abstraction shaping
photography stand as a powerful critique of this fact. A key focus of his work is its
analysis of photography’s promise to act as a universal language, which, as is well
known, reveals the form of such universality to be determined by pervasive ideologies
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of abstract equivalence and exchangeability. His essay “Photography Between Labour
and Capital” of 1983 articulates this in a way that still resonates today.7
Tracing the relationship between mimetic equivalence, universal exchangeability
and calculation in the historical statements of François Arago and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Sekula observes — firstly with respect to Arago’s often quoted announce-
ment of photography’s invention — that:
Photography doubly fulfilled the Enlightenment dream of a universal language: the
universal mimetic language of pictures yielded up a higher truth, a truth that could
be expressed in the universal abstract language of mathematics. (219)
And this dream of a “photographically mathematized nature” quickly found economic
expression in Oliver Wendell Holmes’ projection of a world encompassing encyclo-
paedic photographic archive in which, Sekula continues:
The meaning and value of the photograph ultimately resides in its exchangeable
character, its inclusion within this global archive which translated all sights, all
visions, into relations of formal (and mathematical) equivalence. Holmes saw the
photograph as the stripping of form from matter, and foresaw “a universal
currency of these banknotes … which the sun has engraved for the great Bank
of Nature.” Metaphorically, he made the connection between photographic repre-
sentation, quantification, and commodity exchange. Photography submitted the
world to a uniform logic of representation, just as the global market established a
uniform logic of exchange. (219)
These connections, Sekula goes on to point out, indicate photography’s absorption into
what Georg Simmel termed “the calculating character of modern times” (220).
Sekula’s analyses of particular images, discourses of photography, photographic
practices and institutions have left us with a number of detailed and specific critiques of
this generalised logic of abstraction and its calculative form. What this article can
attempt to do, in coming towards its conclusion, is to offer a brief and supplementary
articulation of some of these questions of abstraction drawing on the questions of scale
discussed above. This, it is hoped, will be suggestive of ways of making new critical
linkages between, for instance, the political geographies shaping the photographic,
their scaling operations and the scaled character of the photographic images, appara-
tuses and modes of experience that emerge and circulate within them.
One point of purchase for such a scaling of photographic abstraction arises from
the recent and ongoing technological transformation of photography and its persistence
as a globally important form despite or perhaps because of these changes. At risk of
over-simplification, on the one hand, this situation only serves to intensify and make
more obvious the fact that photographic apparatuses, images, experiences and uses are
subject to the generalised forms of abstraction Sekula describes and have no life, as
Roberts remarks, on the other side of the effects of abstraction. On the other hand,
the massive expansion and intensification entailed in this processes has brought with it
new forms and infrastructures through which such abstraction operates, which many
have taken to mean that the broad forms and effects of capitalist abstraction familiar
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from Sekula’s critical project no longer apply and that, as a result, photography has
become immaterial in form.8 Here, one can again return to the three modes of
photographic scale outlined above to remark that the function of setting space and
time together and to scale in the form of an image is indissociable from their
actualisation as contingent moments on a sliding scale of possible actualisations and
that these operations are grounded in and through processes unfolding at a global social
scale.
All photographies necessarily find some kind of material form, however attenuated
or dispersed, and, I argue, it is useful to think of this in terms of the ways in which
they take on scale. This is of particular interest for attempts to understand the
networked digital image and its apparent immateriality, often posited in contrast to
the familiar material forms of earlier photographic convention. The networked digital
image may, indeed, be defined by the fact that it can choose not to take on such forms.
But it takes on form nonetheless in being distributed across different spaces, through
dispersed infrastructures and experiential registers, the balance between which is
obviously and highly changeable. Here, as Peter Osborne observes: “There is no single
site of the photograph. … There is a distributive unity to the photograph itself” (124).
The networked digital condition of photography disperses the material form of the
photograph, the ontological significance of which was often previously assumed to be
located in and by one or other material substrate (such as the negative). Taking on such
distributed form means that the photograph is no longer definable by one or other
familiar material substrate, if it ever was. Out of this, the photograph emerges as a
spatially and temporally extended process. But it is material insofar as it takes on scale
across its different and changeable sites of distribution. The analysis of scale pursued
above outlines its meaning as just such a process, and it too is one that can no longer be
thought of as rooted in a particular and privileged object or relation.
The networked digital image takes form as a variegated, compound and modally
organised relationship of scales and it obviously does so in ways that are different from
the pre-digital photograph. Whilst it still finds materiality at photographic scale it also
rests on a radical innovation in photographic scale insofar as this is revealed to be
mutable, variegated and distributive in form. Such images attain their materiality as
variations on a possible admixture of dispersed scales with significant technical,
phenomenological and global as well as perceptual, local and embodied registers.
One might risk saying, in this context at least, that photographic materiality is the
taking on of the admixture of the various scalar modes comprising and supporting the
image and its uses. And into this newly reconfigured admixture of photography’s
scaled relations the tensions between its modes and understandings of abstraction are
reinscribed.
The specific mutations that mark the “calculating character” of present times, and
its photographic modulation of the abstractions’ exchangeability and equivalence, have
produced newly universalised relationships between what the “mimetic language of
pictures” and the “abstract language of mathematics” might continue to mean. These
mutations entail and have foregrounded obvious and not so obvious issues of scale. And
these facts suggest the need for a re-evaluation of the modes of abstraction common to
the photographic in terms of its mutating modes of scale.
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By way of a brief conclusion, one can note that the three associations between
abstraction and photography explored in this article are significantly shaped and/or
oriented towards questions of scale. Whilst the three general observations about scale
and photography discussed in parallel to them do not map neatly or singularly on to
any one of the questions of abstraction considered, all three scaled aspects of the
photographic do touch upon each of the modes of abstraction discussed and enable
connections to be made between them. Thinking about photography and abstraction in
terms of scale has complicated the meaning of the latter term considerably. It has also,
it is hoped, suggested itself as a fruitful theoretical and critical figure, and a productive
way of making connections between otherwise discrete levels of practice and forms of
thinking about the photographic and its on-going association to ideas of abstraction.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 The discussion here draws closely on Peter Osborne’s recent theorisation of the
photograph as a “distributive unity”.
2 See John Roberts’ gloss on these terms in relation to photography in Photography
and its Violations (94). Roberts devotes much of this book to a discussion of the
modes abstraction takes in photography and, in particular, to the “catachreisistic
relationship between the figural and the nonfigural” as this is mediated by the
“overlapping forms of social abstraction (the material and symbolic structures of
domination expressed in the heteronomous character of the built environment, the
social divisions of the landscape, and the repetitive, inertial logic of commodity
relations) and real abstraction (the organization of production and consumption
through the discipline of the value-form, the internalization and naturalization of
the value-form as ‘free competition’)” (93).
3 One exception is the following gloss on Flusser’s conception of the apparatus from
Matthew Fuller: “Here, iterations of multi-scalar relations of causality and inter-
penetration are compiled layer upon layer. Base and superstructure shot through a
kaleidoscope. Programs and metaprograms are never clearly defined as distinct.
The relation is simply one of scale, or of order” (2).
4 Lambert Wiesing remarks on Alvin Langdon Coburn’s use of the term in “The
Future of Pictorial Photography” in 1916 as probably the first explicit use of the
term abstract photography (60).
5 A canonical reference in this context is Lázló Moholy-Nagy. In “A New Instrument of
Vision” from 1936, for instance, he writes: “the photogram, or camera-less record of
forms produced by light, which embodies the unique nature of the photographic
process, is the real key to photography”. Here, a familiar claim emerges, namely, that
the relative “directness”, the lack of mediation characteristic of the process of making
photograms and the uniqueness of its results combine to suggest that the photogram
can be taken as photography in its most reduced and thus in its purest form. This
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reference highlights other ways in which abstract photography might be analysed in
scalar terms and which there is no space to explore here, as, for instance, with
associations between the 1:1 ratio common to the minimalised representational
possibilities of the photogram and the suggestion that this marks a “zero degree” of
photography (see 92‒96). See also Sandra Plummer’s discussion of these issues from
a Heideggerean point of view (173‒183).
6 Gottfried Jäger is a key example here (see Jäger et al.).
7 For a recent appreciation of the continuing critical resonances of this essay, see
Alberto Toscano’s “Photography Against the Flow”.
8 An interesting example of this tendency is Nathanial Cunningham’s, Face Value: An
Essay on the Politics of Photography.
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